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Outline
n What happened?
n Why did it happen?
n What lessons should we learn from it?
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Regulatory Jurisdictions in the United States
California’s Major 
Investor-Owned Utilities
SDG&E
4,763 MW Peak 
Demand
1.2 Million 
Customers
PG&E
SCE
SDG&E
SCE
19,935 MW Peak Demand
4.3 Million Customers
PG&E
23,031 MW Peak 
Demand
4.5 Million Customers
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New Zealand 
5,800 MW Peak Demand
1.6 Million Customers
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Rate Freeze
“HEADROOM”
Business-as-usual Rate Trajectory
¢/kWh
Rate Freeze Creates “Headroom”
for Transition Cost Recovery
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n 20,212 MW Divested so far
n New owners:
AES 4,076
Calpine 1,224
DukeEnergy 3,751
Dynegy 3,447
Port of San Diego 713
Reliant 3,776
Southern 3,065
Thermo Ecotek 280
n Sales proceeds used to reduce customer 
stranded cost obligation
n Market valuation of remaining non-
nuclear generation (over 6,000 MWs) 
required by year-end 2001SCE PG&E SDG&E
10,016
8,040
1,996
California Generation Divestiture
CPUC Initially Insisted that Utilities Buy Everything 
Through the PX and ISO Spot Markets?
n Wanted transparent pricing to assure against self-dealing
n Did not want utilities incurring long-term obligations and 
potentially stranded costs in their role as default provider
n Wanted to encourage independent retailers
– Customers wanting price hedges should seek them from ESPs
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Key Restructuring Rules Created 
Over-Exposure To Spot Market
n CPUC’s requirement that utilities
buy all power through Power Exchange 
and ISO
n Generation divestiture without 
buy-back contracts
n Retail rate freeze
Over-exposure
to the spot 
market
California’s Electricity
Market Crisis
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California Market Prices Have Skyrocketed in 2000
Comparison of Average Cal PX SP15 Monthly* Prices
n Actual prices for last six months of 2000 averaged more than four times 1998 and 1999 prices
*Simple average of all hourly prices within the month
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Cumulative Cost of California Electricity
n Estimated annual cumulative cost to serve all load in the CA ISO’s control area
– Cost includes energy and ancillary services
Source: ISO Board material, January, 2001
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ISO Emergency Operations
n Stage 1 Emergency 3 32 11 40
» Operating reserve below 7%
n Stage 2 Emergency 1 17 9 40
» Operating reserves below 5%
» Interruption of voluntary customers
n Stage 3 Emergency 0 0 1 38
» Operating reserves below 1.5%
» Possible involuntary interruptions
(rolling blackouts)
n Involuntary Rolling Blackouts 0 0 0 2
– Rolling blackouts were initiated on 1/17, 1/18
Summer
1999
Summer
2000
Nov/Dec
2000
Jan/Feb
2001
Occurrences
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How Can Rolling Blackouts 
Be Needed in Winter?
n This winter, the ISO initiated rolling blackouts at a demand of only 65% of last summer’s peak
ISO Actual  Load
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High Wholesale Prices:
Market Fundamentals
n High rate of demand growth
n Virtually no new plants sited
n Reduced availability of imports
n Skyrocketing gas prices
– Pipeline capacity shortages
n Air emissions limitations and high priced emission credits
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SCE Sales Growth Rates
(Weather Adjusted)
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Comparing Growth in Electricity Capacity and Population in 
California vs. Other WSCC States 1993-1999
0 5 10 15 20 25
WSCC (Other)
California
% Change in Capacity MWs 1993-
1999
% Change in Population 1993-1999
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Comparing Growth in Electricity Capacity and Peak Load Demand 
in California vs. Other WSCC States 1993-1999
0 5 10 15 20 25
WSCC (Other)
California
% Change in Capacity MWs 1993-
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% Change in Peak Load Demand
1993-1999
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Natural Gas Prices in 2000
n Prices peak at an unheard level of $60/MMBtu
n Gas prices for the second half of 2000 were more than four times higher than 1998 and 1999 
prices
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Emissions Credit Prices
in Los Angeles Area
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High Wholesale Prices:
Market Structure, Rules, and Conduct
n Complex ISO/PX market protocols
n Large amount of unhedged power purchases
n Underdeveloped demand-side responsiveness
n Question of market power or shortage-induced high prices
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Unhedged
Spot Market
CAISO 40-50% 50-60%
% Market Hedged
(long-term forward contracts,
self-owned generation)
PJM 85-90% 10-15%
New England 80% 20%
Australia 90% 10%
Comparison of Forward Contracting/Hedging
in Other Electricity Markets
Regulatory Constraints in Forward Contracting in CAISO Market 
Was a Key Source of High Costs in Summer 2000
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Utility Undercollections:
Wholesale Average Electricity Prices
as Flowed Through to SCE Customers in
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Procurement Undercollections (SCE)
$Billions
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$644
Million
$457
Million
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$387
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$5.5
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$1.7
Billion
$3.8
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Regulatory and Political Inaction
n FERC’s blamed California for creating a flawed structure
n Californian Governor blamed FERC for not setting tighter 
controls on wholesale prices
n CPUC’s inaction in approving long-term contracts and 
setting reasonableness standards
n CPUC’s unwillingness to end the retail rate freeze last Fall
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California State Government
Enters Power Purchasing Business
n On January 17, Governor Davis authorized the California 
Department of Water Resources (CDWR) to begin purchasing 
spot and short-term power to avoid rolling blackouts
n On February 1, Governor Signed Assembly Bill 1X
– CDWR directed to purchase entire “net short” requirements of utilities
– Authorizes up to $10 billion in revenue bonds for long-term power 
contracts
– CDWR authorized to enter into contracts until 1/2/3003
n CDWR now spending $40-50 million per day on near-term 
power purchases; $3 billion spent so far
n Governor recently announced the signing of 40 long-term 
contracts totaling 8900 MWs
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Governor Davis’ Announced
Utility Recovery Plan
n State purchase of transmission grid at fair value
– Amount in excess of book used to pay down utility 
undercollections
n Utility-owned generation will supply power at cost-based 
rates for ten years
n State receives conservation easements on utility-owned 
wilderness lands
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What’s Needed in the Near Term?
n Reasonable long-term wholesale contracts
– FERC enforcement of its “just and reasonable” standard would be 
helpful
n Reasonable retail price increases
n Assurance of recovery of past and future procurement 
undercollections
n Very serious statewide (and West-wide) conservation 
program
– Governor’s objective is 5,000 MW in Summer 2001
n Continue to foster development of new generation
– Governor’s objective is 5,000 MW by Summer 2001
Is There Long-Term Relief ?
New Generation In California
Generation Scheduled for Summer 2001
5007/1Northwest
4,260Summer 2001 Total 
MWDateProject
2,070California Total 
1,6906/1 – 7/1Southwest
1,0706/1 - 9/1Various
5007/1Los Medanos
5008/1Sutter
California
Approved/Under Construction 6,273 MW
In Licensing 7,716 MW
Proposed 5,780 MW
Total 19,769 MW
California 2001-2004
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California ISO Load/Resource Forecast
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45,565 45,602 50,011 62,861 62,878 62,861 63,190 63,180Max Avail. Gen. Capacity
Max Import Capacity
49,209 50,188 51,463 53,602 54,462 55,306 56,177 57,928Load Forecast + OR
Source: California Independent Operator
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Lessons Learned
n Regulatory vision must be internally consistent - Mixture of 
regulated retail prices and unregulated wholesale prices was an especially 
inconsistent and dangerous combination in California.
n Policies need to respond to unforeseen and unintended 
consequences
n Absence of clear policy accountability creates a slowness or 
inability to respond to evolving problems - The “blame game” 
doesn’t solve problems
n Uncertainty deters investors - key generation investments in late 1990’s 
were delayed due to policy uncertainty
n Market realities cannot be sidestepped - policy design should harness 
rather than ignore these forces 
